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the Innovation of Network Technologies
Eric J. Iversen
This article focuses on the interaction between intellectual property rights (IPRs) re-
gimes and committee-based standards development organisations (SDOs) in terms
of the commodification of knowledge. IPRs and SDOs are institutions that are de-
signed to codify technical knowledge with quite different purposes though. The re-
sulting documents describe a private right (patent) or a public good (a standard).
The article associates the former with a commodification and the latter with a de-
commodification process of technical knowledge, and it explores a situation in which
these respective purposes have come into conflict. The scope for conflict is exam-
ined and analysed in light of the controversy, which emerged during the standard-
ization of GSM telephony in Europe.
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function: each serves to codify current
technical knowledge in detailed and un-
ambiguous terms. The way they do so,
however, and their respective rationales
involve an essential tension: in the one
case, the resulting document essentially
describes a private right (patent) while
the other arguably describes a public
good (a standard).
During the past decade or so, the in-
terplay between these two institutions
has become conflict-prone in the field
The rapid development of information
and communication technologies (ICTs)
thrives on the creation and dissemina-
tion of new knowledge. Intellectual
property rights (IPRs) regimes and
standards development organisations
(SDOs) are two important elements of
the institutional infrastructure that fa-
cilitate the generation and diffusion of
new technical knowledge and, by so do-
ing, promote technological innovation.
These two institutions share a central
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of ICTs. Here, the codified knowledge
found in patents has come into conflict
with that found in individual voluntary
standard specifications. This paper ex-
plores this relatively new area of contro-
versy from the perspective that it pits the
domain of proprietary assets against
that of public goods. We do so by explor-
ing a case – the first case – of conflict that
emerged on this tension-filled front, that
of the standardization of GSM telephony
in Europe. The case will allow us a van-
tage point from which to explore the re-
spective roles IPRs regimes and SDOs
play as institutions of commodi-fication
and de-commodification, to describe
the scope for conflict and to analyse it.
Background
A discussion of knowledge commodi-
fication tends to start with a considera-
tion of how the “computerization of so-
ciety” is affecting the nature of knowl-
edge. Lyotard (1984) points to broad
transformations associated with this
‘computerization’ process and argues
that it is pushing towards an “exteriori-
sation of knowledge.” The idea is that
knowledge is increasingly being trans-
formed into an informational commod-
ity. This reorientation fundamentally af-
fects the motivation for the creation of
new knowledge and the way it is con-
sumed and it has fundamental implica-
tions for the advancement of productiv-
ity (“productive power”) in a political-
economic sense.
Much of the analysis based on the
commodification argument focuses on
the way knowledge is accumulated es-
pecially in learning environments. The
emphasis of such analysis is placed on
the way ICT transforms knowledge into
an informational commodity primarily
because it facilitates diffusion/distribu-
tion via information bits. In this paper
we join the discussion from a somewhat
different angle. We enter a discussion of
the dynamics of knowledge production
and consumption as they manifest
themselves in the production of infor-
mation and communication technolo-
gies themselves. Instead of focusing on
how existing ICTs affect the way knowl-
edge is disseminated to society, we look
at how technical knowledge is accumu-
lated for the generation of the technolo-
gies themselves. This can be seen as an
internal loop in the larger evolution of
the computerization process. The idea
is that the ways new information and
communication technologies are devel-
oped ultimately shape the way they
spread information and thus promote
knowledge accumulation. This knowl-
edge feeds back into the way ICTs are
shaped: there is a dynamic interaction
between technology and society. There is
a complicated argument here, which es-
sentially distinguishes itself from the “lin-
ear model of innovation”. (See Nelson &
Winter, 1982; Dosi et al.,1988).
One important locus for studying the
interaction between society and technol-
ogy is the institutional framework of in-
novation. Institutions such as IPR-re-
gimes and standards development or-
ganisations are important in shaping how
technical knowledge is accumulated and
disseminated during the innovation of
ICTs. In economic terms, the first is gen-
erally characterized as an “incentive
structure” that promotes the production
of new knowledge while the latter is gen-
erally characterized as a “non-market
selection environment” (Nelson & Win-
ter, 1982) that helps facilitate technologi-
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cal diffusion by promoting coordination.
In this context, the premise is that (i)
IPRs (especially patents) represent in
general a fairly clear case in which the
codification of technical knowledge leads
to commodification, and that (ii) the
specifications produced by standards
development organisations in general
represent an arena where codification
leads to the de-commodification of
knowledge. Based on this hypothesis, the
paper focuses on how the rapid develop-
ment of the ICT field has brought the two
institutions into conflict. We demonstrate
the potential for conflict between the
commodification and de-commodi-
fication of knowledge by looking at the
IPR controversy that arose during the
standardization of the GSM system.
Preliminary Observations about
Institutions and Commodification
We start with a couple of initial observa-
tions about the way the institutions
“package” new knowledge. A patent and
a technical (consensus) standard are es-
sentially documents. They codify the
technical details of new economically
relevant knowledge. The reason and
method for this codification is of course
very different in the two cases. In the
case of a patent, the codification de-
scribes the technical product or process
over which the assignee is given defined
rights of control (limited geographically
and temporally). We will generally illus-
trate the case of intellectual property
rights via the most familiar type of rights,
patents. A patent represents a commodi-
fication of the underlying knowledge
and it acts to create a private good out
of knowledge. On the other hand, a
standard elaborated through a standards
development organisation (SDO) is a set
of technical specifications describing a
system design that the SDO recom-
mends to the market at large. This is es-
sentially a collective process, where the
rationale is to overcome compatibility
problems and/or to promote network
externalities. In this case the standard
becomes a public good (see Samuelson,
1955).
Intellectual Property Rights
The case that patents effectively commo-
dify knowledge is most clear. A given pat-
ent will in its claims define the steps nec-
essary to make a particular technology
work. The patent system can be said to
codify new knowledge in order to assign
limited ownership. Through the patent,
technical knowledge becomes a com-
modity that can be bought, sold and
leased, or kept for oneself. This has the
effect, it is believed, of providing an in-
centive to invent: the IPR system is
therefore associated with the generation
of new technical knowledge. As we will
illustrate below, patents are in practice
also used to promote non-competitive
processes as in the context of R&D col-
laboration. There is, however, another
function from a public policy point of
view that complicates this picture. In
exchange for monopoly protection, the
patent holder allows a detailed techni-
cal description of his invention to be
published and made freely available.
When patents lapse (usually after 20
years), anyone can use the invention free
of charge. In this sense, the codification
also acts in the case of patents as a way
to disseminate knowledge. (i.e. bringing
it into the public sphere)
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Standards Development Organisations
The case that voluntary standards devel-
opment organisations effectively de-
commodify knowledge is a bit more
complicated to present. Schmidt & Werle
(1998) provide a description of the type
of standard we are looking at:
Standards result from the intricate in-
teraction of company business strate-
gies, standards committee activities,
government interventions, and proc-
esses of market diffusion, and they are
rooted in the perceived technical re-
quirements for developing, manufac-
turing, operating or using devices that
are meant to inter-work with others.
(Schmidt & Werle, 1998: 33)
This description indicates that the
standardization process brings together
commercial, academic and regulatory
actors who, through this complex inter-
action, identify the need for common
specifications, who elaborate, develop
and ultimately diffuse technical specifi-
cations. The standard specifications for
a technology will define how the various
components of the system should work
and – more instrumentally – interwork.
One general economic argument for
formal standards-writing is that markets
seem to have trouble facilitating a satis-
factory cross-over between variety and
standardization. Timely selection of
standards allows a technology to grow
and reap the benefits of economies of
scale, network externalities and the cu-
mulative, collective learning process.
Another rationale for collective stan-
dardization is to promote compatibility
between technical systems and between
components in systems.
Standards development organisa-
tions help to achieve these benefits by
codifying technical specifications and
distributing the resulting standards.
Committee based standards are sold as
publications at the price to cover some
of the costs represented by the docu-
ment. On the other hand, the technol-
ogy is free in the sense that the reader of
the standardized technology can then
utilize the knowledge freely.
The important institutional aspects of
committee standardization is that the
process allows for the participation of a
wide range of interested actors, includ-
ing users. This is on the basis of a rule of
due-process, and essentially involves a
consensual decision process. The collec-
tive nature of this codification process
indicates the de-commodifying role of
standards and its design to promote the
spread of the knowledge as broadly as
possible. We will demonstrate how the
standardization process can be inter-
preted as de-commodifying in more
depth by looking at the GSM case.
The GSM Case
The formalization of the GSM system
provides a necessary context about the
state of knowledge in this particular
technology, the role of the formal proc-
ess of standardization and how in this
process the standard and the patent in-
stitutions can come into conflict.
Background
In many social contexts, the GSM1 sys-
tem may well be the most widespread
avatar of the so-called ICT Revolution.
Today this mobile communications sys-
tem has a pervasive position in a remark-
able diversity of societies. GSM handsets
are in use in scores of countries, ranging
from the Nordic countries, where its use
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is rife, to Bangladesh, where single hand-
sets are reported to act in lieu of non-
available fixed-lined telephony for entire
villages.
The ancestry of the GSM system itself
is not especially “revolutionary”. The first
commercial incarnation of a mobile
telecom system in fact dates back to the
1940s (in Saint Louis, USA), with other
mobile systems for police and more im-
portantly, the army predating that by a
couple of decades. The evolution of mo-
bile communications has therefore in-
volved a rather long period of accumu-
lation of knowledge about how to effi-
ciently use energy waves in the remote
transmission and reception of informa-
tion. The technical feasibility of the ba-
sic idea was not enough. Great improve-
ments in the total capacity and efficiency
of the system had to be made before
mobile communications were remotely
feasible in market terms. Besides, one
could only guess at what the market po-
tential was, and these guesses tended, in
retrospect, to be very conservative.
The technical knowledge needed to
improve system capacity took a remark-
ably long period to accumulate. During
several decades, knowledge was accu-
mulated on how to best use dimension
cells, (re)use frequency bands, how to
“handoff” discrete signals between cells,
improve signal transmission and recep-
tion and automate the link to the fixed-
line network. These technical areas are
just hinted at here in order to illustrate
the range of technical areas involved (see
Mouly & Pautet (1992) for relevant tech-
nical issues of mobile-communica-
tions). The advent of the transistor was
also instrumental. It was only at the end
of the seventies and in the early eighties
that the first spate of large-scale systems
began to emerge, notably AMPS, TACS,
C1, and NMT. These few successful and
thus visible examples eclipse many other
ideas and some other systems (eg. CT-
2/Telepoint system) that have perished
in the process.
The GSM system began to take shape
simultaneously with the launch of these
analogue systems. It would take another
decade before the GSM system was
launched. Its launch was met by the criti-
cism of some (cf. Gilder, 1993) that GSM
utilized old-hat technologies. Indeed,
the GSM system built on a stock of ex-
isting knowledge and this is arguably
part of its strength. For example, it re-
lied on known methods for multiple-ac-
cess (Time Division Multiple Access,
TDMA), which were within the design
capabilities of the technicians (Bekkers,
2001: 323). Although known, this was a
technique that had not been used on a
large, commercial scale.
GSM’s major achievement was that it
coordinated the design for a digital mo-
bile system and that it orchestrated the
concerted launch of this large technical
system in a large area: i.e. Western Eu-
rope at a critical time. In technical terms,
the system did provide a design by which
relatively high traffic cell technology
could be integrated upon a digital plat-
form (for technical details, see Mouly &
Pautet, 1992; Bekkers, 2001). It also man-
aged to coordinate the introduction of a
new set of services, including Short Mes-
sage System (SMS) and, more instru-
mentally, Roaming.
GSM Standards
The fantastic spread of the GSM system
was not a case of serendipitous chance.
The system involved a multi-layered ef-
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fort of coordination, ultimately centred
on the coordination of technical dimen-
sions in a standards development envi-
ronment. In fact, the GSM system was
in many respects the antithesis of the
invention-in-garage-by-individual-gen-
ius type often caricatured for the ICT
area. Instead of the individual, there
were separate groups of technicians who
represented partially competitive inter-
ests; instead of the garage, there was the
large standards development organisa-
tion (actually two, since the project was
moved in mid-stream); and instead of an
invention, there was a hefty document
describing how the system should work.
And behind the scenes, there was con-
siderable oversight by political interests.
In this section we note some of the char-
acteristics of the GSM standardization
process.
The standardization of GSM involved
the detailed codification of technical
know-how. The GSM system is based on
10,000 pages of technical specifications.
In this sense, GSM is a document – a
standard – that details the GSM900 and
DCS1800 technologies, and not a tech-
nology itself. This document codifies a
total of 280 recommendations that cover
two phases of the system’s deployment
(phase #1 and #2: see Table 1) and that
include the specifications for a related
PCS network at 1800MHz (DCS1800;
“delta specs”). The “specs” cover all as-
pects of the system, from interfaces, to
switching (NSS), to radio transmission
and reception, to channel coding, to ter-
minal specifications, to service recom-
mendations etc.
The standardization process was ini-
tiated in the committee-based standardi-
zation environment of CEPT (Conférence
européenne des administrations des
postes et télécommunications). This her-
itage witnesses to sponsorship by Euro-
pean service-providers (the old PTTs of
the CEPT system) and regulators. As the
deregulation of the European telecoms
markets started, however, the GSM was
handed over to the new European Tel-
ecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI), where the process grew to in-
clude a set of vendors from inside and
outside Europe. The ETSI was estab-
lished in line with the recommendations
from the Green paper on the develop-
ment of the common market for tel-
ecommunications services and equip-
ment (European Commission, 1987),
which signaled the deregulation of the
telecom market in Europe. The ETSI in-
cluded multinationals including compa-
nies with their headquarters outside
Europe, for example Motorola.
It is interesting to note that the name
GSM actually pays tribute to people, spe-
cifically the members of Groupe Spécial
Mobile (GSM) in the CEPT system who
started to explore the potential for a pan-
European mobile communications sys-
tem. The “global” dimension of GSM
only came later as political momentum
gathered and a larger, more diverse
group of collaborators were involved.
The standards were elaborated primarily
by representatives of vendors and ser-
vice-providers. The design of the system
was negotiated among the participants
according to five basic sets of require-
ments set out by the special committee.
These included cost aspects, network
aspects, radio-frequency utilization,
quality of service and security (Mouly &
Pautet, 1992). The standards provide in-
formation and guidelines to a wide range
of vendors and service-providers about
how the system is to be put together,
Iversen 11.12.2001, 16:2371
Science Studies 2/2001
72
operated and maintained.
The GSM standards represent a com-
prehensive codification of the mobile
network system. They were in fact delib-
erately over- detailed in order to reduce
uncertainty in the launch of the system
throughout the different contexts of the
European telecom markets. A high de-
gree of codification was also desirable so
that new actors (not only the incum-
bents) and other markets could imple-
ment the system with minimal difficulty.
The high degree of codification was
therefore part of a strategy to promote
world-wide diffusion of the system, an
intention that the name “global systems
for mobile communications” amply
implies. This strategy is also suggested
by the high degree of coordination that
took place on other planes than just the
technical: considerable activity in indus-
trial policy spheres was involved inter-
nally (principally involving France, Ger-
many and Sweden), and externally. (cf.
Cattaneo, 1994; Iversen, 1999b) The
technical standardization process was
one part of a more comprehensive sys-
tems-building project in which techni-
cal, political and institutional aspects of
the GSM system were engineered in
great detail (Bender, 1999).
De-Commodification and Public Good
The important point about the stand-
ardization of GSM to emphasize in our
context is that the extensive codification
of the GSM standards had the effect, if
not the primary motivation, to spread
this particular technological system
widely. The codification of the standards,
and their regulatory sponsorship, en-
couraged the broad implementation of
the standards. This broad implementa-
tion has brought with it apparent wel-
fare benefits, some evidence for which
is found in the decreasing cost to the in-
dividual user over time.
The standards themselves served to
contextualise knowledge already accu-
Table 1. Timeline of mobile-communications.
Mobile communications highlights
1946 First civilian mobile system launched in Missouri
1979 900 MHZ band reserved by the World Administrative Radio Conference
(WARC of the International Telecommunications Union). This
substantively laid the basis for the development of mobile communications.
AMPS launched (Bell Labs)
1981 NMT (cooperation between Scandinavian PTTS  and some manufacturers)
1982 First meeting of Groupe Spécial Mobile (GSM) in Stockholm
1985 TACS  (AMP- based)
1986 Validations Systems tested
1987 GSM opted for ‘the broad-avenue’ digital approach
GSM Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
1988 ETSI instituted
IPR conflict commences with refusal of MOU terms
1989 GSM transferred to ETSI
1991 GSM phase I standards
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mulated, to package it in a system that
served a practical (and as it turns out,
important) role, and to transmit it to a
wide audience. In this sense, GSM stan-
dards served to de-commodify technical
know-how and place it into a (quasi-)
public sphere.
In more economic terms, the GSM
case demonstrates several welfare-ben-
efits that distinguish it from a private-
good and that associate it with a public
good. One aspect of this is that the stan-
dard renders the know-how into an “in-
formation good”. Off the top, the GSM
standards are expandable (or “non-ri-
val”) in the sense that one’s use doesn’t
per se exclude or negatively affect the
use of others: everyone in the world
could, at marginal cost, own their own
set of GSM standards (given shelf- space)
and this would not reduce their inher-
ent value. In fact the more consumers
that ultimately utilize the system de-
scribed by those standards, the greater
the utility has become for each indi-
vidual user: in this sense they have suc-
cessfully generated positive network-
externalities. The politically sponsored
set of standards codifying a single tech-
nology further reduced the search costs
by becoming a de facto standard (a mar-
ket standard, like Windows), and it
avoided further orphaning effects among
subscribers to losing technologies like
Telepoint (see Grindley & Toker, 1993).
There is also a great deal of literature on
the economic rationale of consensus
standards (see Iversen (2001) for one
overview).
The more substantial aspect of the
public good argument is, however, that
it puts the know-how in the public do-
main. This does not rule out making
profits with the technology. Codification
in the standards-writing process allows
knowledge about the set of techniques
to be exchanged and ultimately imple-
mented which is definitely guided by
profit motives. Nonetheless, there are
aspects indicating that standards like the
GSM standards also have a role in de-
commodifying technical knowledge. Al-
though profits ultimately motivate par-
ticipants, all the profits were not cap-
tured by the developers themselves.
Some of the advantages from the re-
source allocation can be said to spread
to society at large. This set of welfare
benefits is itself facilitated by the govern-
ment sponsorship of the standards. This
opens a considerable debate over the de
jure versus de facto standardization, par-
ticularly the ability of regulators to pro-
mote technology standards responsibly
and effectively (cf. David & Shurmer,
1996).
Another way to look at GSM standards
as an exercise in de-commodifying
knowledge is to consider what would
have happened to underlying technical
knowledge without them. We recall that
the standards-process like that of the
GSM essentially involves the design of a
new system based on available technol-
ogy. The process adds to our total knowl-
edge in at least two ways. First, the pro-
cess uses technologies that might oth-
erwise not have found their way into the
greater social setting. We recall that mo-
bile technology has some roots in mili-
tary technology, and that its diffusion in
civil spheres has been limited. GSM ef-
fectively changed that. The GSM stan-
dards also used newer technologies with
military origins (like the TDMA) that had
not reached wide-scale commercial
markets, and which might have been
consigned to the junk heap without the
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standards.
A second aspect is that the standards
process itself helps accumulate new
knowledge. During the standardization
process knowledge is generated by us-
ing and adapting extant technologies
and by encouraging their combination.
It becomes a locus for the coordination
of technical ideas and their articulation
to non-technical conditions as per-
ceived by the participating agents. These
condition the range of new applications
that subsequently emerge.
Intellectual Property Rights and
Emerging Controversy
When the specifications for the GSM
standards were being articulated, the
technical committees were working in
an field where research had already been
conducted during previous decades.
Some were areas, which were heavily
protected especially by patents, but also
by software copyrights. Even though the
committees were not attempting to
reinvent the wheel but to lay functional
guidelines, it became clear that there
was a risk for conflict between the tech-
nical specifications being codified and
the codex of relevant IPRs, especially
given the comprehensiveness of the sys-
tem. Let us look at the emergence of the
conflict and its implications.
In 1988, the main technical dimen-
sions of the GSM system had begun to
take form. At this stage, the first com-
mercial contacts began taking place be-
tween customers (the Telecom Opera-
tors, TOs) and vendors (equipment sup-
pliers) for the provision of equipment
based on the GSM specifications. This
took place at the same time that vendors
were being co-opted into the standard-
ization process, during its transition to
ETSI. It was in the associated round of
bidding that the IPR conflict began to
emerge.
At this stage, concerns were raised
that the implementation of essential as-
pects of the GSM specifications would
implicate a number of IPRs (in the form
of patents). This is to say, that the ven-
dors who followed the specifications
would, by doing so, infringe existing pat-
ents. The “essentialness” of the patents
is important to emphasize: it entails that
vendors could not avoid the technology
described in IPRs and at the same time
build the technology specified by the
standards. Thus essential IPRs could ef-
fectively block the standards and stop
the implementation of the technology.
This posed a fundamental paradox:
following the one guideline (the stan-
dards) meant breaking another (the
rights of the patent holders). In the GSM
case this was especially delicate because
the GSM standards were mandatory
standards and therefore had to be used
to participate in the EU market for mo-
bile communications. This style of regu-
latory standard was used in this case to
promote the harmonization objectives
in the common economic area. The
codified technical specifications were
more than guidelines, they had the force
of a regulation. One set of rules was on a
collision course with a set of internation-
ally recognized laws (intellectual property
rights), and since there was no clear re-
dress to the problem, the EU attempted
to clarify its position without intervening
via another layer of codification: the
Communication of the Commission on
Intellectual property rights and stand-
ardisation. (European Commission, 1992)
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Touchstone for Inter-Institutional
Conflict
In general it should be noted that the
potential for “blocking IPRs” had always
been a theoretic possibility in the draft-
ing of technical specifications. The theo-
retical possibility, however, was for the
first time in the GSM case perceived to
be a real threat. The GSM case was also
said to presage a rash of such conflicts
(see Iversen, 1999a). We will look at the
circumstances of the conflict and draw
out some of factors that were specific to
it, as well as others that support the hy-
pothesis that the risk for such contro-
versy would grow.
Memorandum of Misunderstanding
In the GSM case, the confrontation be-
tween IPRs and the standardization
process was provoked by another layer
of codification, an agreement called the
GSM Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU)2. This document was entered into
by the network administrators and op-
erators of 15 CEPT countries in 1987, and
it put into place the logistics of a coordi-
nated launch from the public network
operators’ point of view. In it, the signa-
tories committed themselves to a com-
mon organisational line on the deploy-
ment of the GSM system.
The MoU was designed by the public
network operators (PNOs) to minimize
coordination risks associated with the
orchestrated launch of a complex tech-
nical system. It was imperative to the
success of the GSM system that the
launch be synchronized, that equip-
ment-type be proved compatible and
that there was a rolling commitment to
the future development of the system.
Another important area of risk was IPRs.
Approaches to this area were to be har-
monized. This included the terms gov-
erning bidders’ freedom to exercise their
IPRs that were employed unilaterally by
the 17 participating PNOs.
What was contentious for equipment
makers with relevant IPR portfolios was
that the contracts specified that equip-
ment suppliers were to undertake to li-
cense any patents “essential” to manu-
facturing for the GSM system: there was
an obligation to license all essential IPRs
within the CEPT-area royalty-free and
there was an obligation to license IPRs
to all-comers outside the CEPT area at
“fair, reasonable and non-discrimina-
tory terms.”
The MoU functioned as an agreement
among purchasers in which 100% of the
market was represented. Such an agree-
ment was not unfamiliar to companies
working in EU countries in what can be
termed the “monopoly provider’s para-
digm”, ie. before the effect of the 1987
Green Paper towards deregulation and
liberalization began to be felt. During
this paradigm, each country had its own
PTT which was at once the regulator and
the operator. Beneath them, there was
generally a primary equipment provider
that was groomed as the national cham-
pion. In this situation, it was the opera-
tor who codified the technical specifica-
tions and then passed these to their na-
tional champions, who were expected to
clear any IPR problem. As telecoms mar-
kets started to be deregulated (or re-
regulated) and new equipment suppli-
ers moved in the assumption appeared
to be heroic that the equipment suppli-
ers would accept the IPR terms although
the regulatory context was changing.
It is clear that the terms were meant
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to defuse the risk that IPRs could pose
to the collective launch of this “over
specified system.” At first the “national
champions” did not seem inclined to
challenge these terms, despite the fact
that they found them “unfair”. The indi-
vidual situation of the different suppli-
ers must however be seen in terms of a
set of factors that includes: The number
of patents that could be construed as
“essential” to the GSM standard; their
technical area and, related, the orienta-
tion of the company IPR strategy includ-
ing how to enter opening markets else-
where on the globe.
The Controversy
The IPR controversy was set off when the
US based Motorola signalled that it was
not going to accept the MoU terms (see
Iversen, 1995). Motorola claimed to have
a large number of patents – between two
dozen and 30 – that were essential (3
times as many as the nearest rival);
Motorola’s patented technologies were
in areas of once-off investments, in
which royalty income was seen as im-
portant supplement; Motorola lacked
market shares in Europe and Motorola
had an in-house IPR policy that was
much more aggressive than that of most
Europeans. These factors contributed to
its unwillingness to accept the IPR terms
on offer.
The controversy emerged in the con-
text of a relatively inactive patenting cul-
ture in Europe. In this context, Motorola’s
refusal was seen as an “aggressive use of
patents”, and it can be said that as a re-
sult Motorola’s behavior triggered a new
era of awareness of IPRs in telecommu-
nications. Given the ongoing changing
market situation especially in Europe,
Motorola’s IPR strategy to gain market
share was actively adopted by all other
players (Miselbach & Nicholson, 1994).
The European PNOs found them-
selves in a vulnerable position when the
range and number of intellectual prop-
erty rights reputed to be implicated by
the GSM system they had sponsored
began to emerge. Motorola was by no
means alone. As this information be-
came available, it must have increasingly
seemed that the successful launch of
GSM depended on the IPR holders’ will-
ingness to enter the MoU stipulation of
royalty-free licensing. One concern was
the risk that “cumulative” licensing
costs3 would price GSM out of the mar-
ket or that IPRs would not be licensed.
The system was indeed perceived to
be extremely vulnerable. Therefore
when Motorola4 refused the terms of the
MoU undertaking, demanding separate
individual contracts, the systems build-
ers’ concerns reached a pitch. A series
of accusations and recriminations was
sparked between 1988-89, that called
into question Motorola’s strategy and the
fate of the GSM system. Was this US
based manufacturer refusing to license
its patents? Would the terms it de-
manded give it such an advantage that
it would take de facto control of the Eu-
ropean market? Against a background
where the system was more vulnerable
than expected, rumours emerged that
Motorola was trying to use its “essential”
intellectual property rights in order to
hold the GSM standards process to ran-
som. Motorola argued, with the tacit sup-
port of some of the suppliers, that the
PNOs were abusing their position in
CEPT like a cartel to dictate licensing con-
ditions. A consensus was not achieved
with the exception that the MoU was gen-
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erally regarded as a “failure”.
So what happened? De-commodi-
fication did not occur. But the licensing
practices of Motorola and the other
companies did not result in prohibitively
high royalties in the EU. GSM could bear
the royalty costs, has proven competitive
and spread to many countries.
Increasing Scope for Conflict: the
Legacy of the GSM Case
The lasting legacy of the GSM case is that
the IPR conflict went from being a theo-
retic possibility to becoming a factor that
could fundamentally shape technologi-
cal development in this field. As market
stakes rise, the “essential patent” contro-
versy will create more serious problems.
Several more recent cases illustrate that
the tense relationship between Intellec-
tual Property Rights and standardization
has spread. It has since grown to include
both different types of IPRs (patents and
software) and different levels of stand-
ardization: regional (ETSI), international
(ISO) and industrial level (Video-Elec-
tronics Standards Association, VESA). In
the latter case, the conflict was involved
in a formal regulatory decision (the Fed-
eral Trade Commission vs. Dell comput-
ers: Decision C-3658, consent order, May
20, 1996)
The indication is that the IPR problem
signalled by the GSM standards has in-
deed gained scope (Iversen, 1999b). This
has caused growing concern. In a recent
article, a former policy director at the
Federal Trade Commission complained
that increasing patent litigation is mak-
ing it harder for technology standards
groups to operate, not least in the semi-
conductors industry. (Balto, 2001: 8)
IPRs in the Changing ICT Field
There are several factors about the
current markets for information and
communication technologies that aug-
ment the importance of IPRs as a means
of commodifying new knowledge. Sev-
eral observations on the level and nature
of IPR use in the field of ICTs are there-
fore in order, as these issues condition
how IPRs can be, and are being exer-
cised, in the context of ICT standardiza-
tion.
In general, the use of IPRs is high and
the modes of use diverse in the ICT field.
One indication of the high patent inten-
sity is that the large ICT companies (such
as IBM) top the list for the greatest num-
bers of applications in the US. But the
activity is not limited to large multi-na-
tional corporations: high patent propen-
sity is found pretty well across the board.
This special patent-intensity may reflect
several things. It suggests a high degree
of exploration in an area undergoing
“revolutionary” development. But, it
also suggests that this is an area where
there is a high propensity to patent, an
area where the competition environ-
ment promotes active patenting strate-
gies. One aspect is that the high level of
activity (reputedly) promotes a con-
stantly changing pattern of collabora-
tion and competition in the ICT area.
Companies collaborate and compete al-
ternately or even simultaneously in de-
veloping new products and markets.
This so-called “co-opetive” climate in-
vites a diversity of IPR strategies. More
generally however, we should expect to
find high degree of use and a diversity of
usages of the intellectual property rights
in a field that defines itself according to
its “knowledge assets”.
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As indicated earlier, patents are not
exclusively – perhaps not evenly mainly
– used to extract monopoly rents from
knowledge in the ICT area. Among other
uses, patents can act as a signal to po-
tential collaborators and a means to fa-
cilitate such collaborations. They are
also used defensively to a large degree,
to prevent others from claiming rights to
technology. In many cases the rights are
not actually exercised, but maintained
as a bargaining chip (in collaborative
R&D, in mergers and acquisitions) or a
cloaked warning against litigation.
In short, IPR protection of technologi-
cal knowledge is an active area charac-
terized by changing rules, practices and
strategies. These changes combined
with those we find in formal standards-
setting bodies bring the two institutions
into conflict with each other.
Standards Development Organisations
in the Changing ICT Field
The formal standardization process is
likewise an area of intense activity and of
changing patterns. The ways standard-
setting is changing as an institution re-
flect especially a confluence of changes
in the technology (e.g. the pace of change,
rising complexity) with changes in the
regulatory framework (e.g. deregulation
and new markets). Although an anomaly
in some senses, the GSM case illustrates
some of the trends that are important in
the standardization process and that,
directly and indirectly, influence the po-
tential for conflict with intellectual prop-
erty rights.
Move Towards Anticipatory Standards
One current tendency is to move the
standardization process in front of the
market. Originally the voluntary stand-
ards that were elaborated by standards
development organisations reflected
market preference: standard specifica-
tions codified how market-standards
work and how they might inter-work
with other systems. (Cargill, 1989) More
recently, there has been a push to stand-
ardize a priori market introduction. This
anticipatory standardization moves in
the direction of development. Collabo-
rative R&D takes place to a certain de-
gree within the SDO’s working groups.
The GSM standards can be seen as a
combination of post-market and pre-
market standardization. As noted, much
of the system was based on existing tech-
nology. At the same time it was the first
digital cellular communication system.
The likelihood of encountering active
IPRs is visibly increased because the
technology is more recent and because
a certain measure of development be-
comes involved.
Proliferation of Standards-Setting Bodies
As with the technology itself, the insti-
tutional framework of standards-setting
bodies is diversifying and proliferating.
Standards-setting bodies are mush-
rooming not only in number but also in
type. There is a growing number of vol-
untary standards development organ-
isations which reflect the emergence of
new markets in both technological and
geographical terms. Alongside the broad-
ening network of SDOs, a distinct system
of consortia has grown up. Consortia in-
volve market-players on a technology-to-
technology basis. The system of consor-
tia is composed of cross-membership of
mostly multinational firms, which link
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producers of ICT goods and services
with suppliers of complementary prod-
ucts. Sometimes consortia submit their
specifications for approval by recog-
nized SDOs.
The GSM standards emerged during
an institutional transition. The standard-
ization process was begun in the CEPT
(a European PTT organ) and continued
in ETSI, where service providers and
manufacturers including multinational
companies were involved. This move
towards more diversified membership
affects the IPR question. Different actors
traditionally have different propensities
to amass patent portfolios – the classic
example being between PNOs with rela-
tively few patents and manufacturers
with many patents. There have been dif-
ferences in attitudes towards patenting,
with American companies renown for
more active patenting strategies than
Europeans. Further, different actors
have different interests, different per-
spectives, and different expectations
which condition how they are likely to
utilize their patent portfolios in a given
situation. Bringing different actors to-
gether who have not worked together
before therefore opens for new areas of
friction and greater uncertainty.
Detailed Versus Minimal Specifications
The GSM standards again involve a very
comprehensive set of specifications. The
high degree of specification raises sev-
eral issues. On the one hand, detailed
and unambiguous specifications can
help ensure compatibility and inter-
operability within and between tech-
nologies that are becoming increasingly
complex. On the other, increased detail
reduces the scope for individual provid-
ers to do much more than implement
the standards. In the GSM case, “the lati-
tude left to manufacturers consists of the
possibility to group canonical entities in
a single machine (in which case canoni-
cal interfaces disappear) or to split the
entity into several distinct, possibly dis-
tant machines (thus creating ‘propri-
etary’ interfaces” (Mouly & Pautet, 1992:
83).
More to the point in our discussion,
greater detail raises the risk that the
specifications might involve proprietary
technologies that are protected by intel-
lectual property rights. The greater the
detail of the standards, the more they
resemble the formulation of patents and
thus the greater the scope for the two to
come into conflict. In the GSM case, the
“over- specification” was to a degree de-
liberate, owing to the overriding concern
that the system must connect with ex-
isting analog networks as well as pro-
actively to ISDN networks. Not only
must the GSM system connect; it must
be interoperable despite the idiosyncra-
sies built into the dissimilar national
networks. As an indicator of how formi-
dable such a task is, the GSM system as
laid out in the 10,000 pages still needs to
be tweaked in order to interoperate
properly. In general, the trade- off be-
tween insuring interoperability among
complicated technologies and main-
taining a tradition of ‘minimal, voluntary
performance objectives’ is becoming
more intricate.
The Time-Frame
A common complaint about formal
standardization processes is that it takes
too long to produce the specifications.
The timeframe of the standardization
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process is seen as increasingly important
in markets characterized by shortening
product horizons and general uncer-
tainty. In broad terms, the standardiza-
tion of GSM took some ten years. This is
indeed a lengthy time-period especially
given the rapid pace of technical change
in telecommunications and adjoining
information technologies. The duration
is proof of the extent of standardization,
as well as to the complexity and coordi-
nation problems involved.
In terms of the IPR question, the
length of time it takes to arrive at stan-
dard specifications increasingly be-
comes an issue. While standardization is
under way, active research which might
be patented continues and perhaps is
even augmented by the knowledge that
a standard is under development in a
certain area. Thus, while a standard is
under development for a longer time
period, it risks duplicating patents that
are being created outside this process.
The longer a standard takes to be devel-
oped the greater the chance that the
standard will become the victim of a
“multiple discovery” or that the trajec-
tory of the standard will be leaked from
the Working Parties to “carpet-bagger”
companies who then start developing
patents in the hope of winding up with
an essential patent. This is specifically a
problem with relation to standards that
cover a wide breadth of technical func-
tions, such as the GSM standards. In ad-
dition to the individual technical areas
covered, the wide breadth of the GSM
standards also risked implicating so-
called “system patents” which cover con-
cepts that pervade the system such as
those claimed for TDMA (Time Division
Multiple Access).
This is making for an increasingly
densely-packed “IPR Mine- field” through
which a standard must navigate. While
R&D intensifies and the numbers of in-
tellectual property rights increase, pat-
ents can live for up to 20 years. This
means a growing pool of patents, which
might block standards.
Conclusions
An important area of potential conflict
has emerged in the interaction between
two central institutional components of
the innovation infrastructure: intellec-
tual property rights regimes and stand-
ards development organisations. We
linked the codification of knowledge in
the case of IPRs to a commodification
process and in that of standard specifi-
cations to a de-commodification proc-
ess, and demonstrated how the former
has started to collide with the latter in
the ICT field. The case of GSM standardi-
zation illustrated how the scope for con-
flict first emerged as telecommunica-
tions moved from the traditional market
situation based on stable collaboration
patterns to a market situation, which
was considerably less fixed. Factors as-
sociated with the emerging competitive
climate were considered that lead to
conflicts. As GSM was seen to lay the
basis for a new market individual actors
used their patents in order to position
themselves in this market rather than
conceding the patents for the sake of the
public good (the standard).
The conflict between standards and
patents has wider implications for the
interaction between technology and so-
ciety because it ultimately affects the
paths technological change can take and
the ways applications can be shaped.
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Notes
1  “Global System for Mobile-communica-
tions” includes a family of technologies
comprised of GSM (900), DCS-1800, PCS-
1900 and GSM-400.
2  This contractual agreement has in turn
become a governing body composed of
signatories. See http://www.cellular.
co.za/gsm- mou.htm for details.
3 The price of all IPR royalties. Even in a
situation in which all IPR holders accept
‘fair terms’, the cost of all royalties might
still exceed market realities. In the case in
which one actor alone claims over twenty
patents and several patent holders are in-
volved, one can understand this concern.
4 Other suppliers who called the MoU terms
unacceptable and unfair also had sub-
stantial claims to patents in the GSM sys-
tem.
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